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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-FURTHER
COMMENTS ON FEDERALISM-Until a decade ago, the nation's lawyers paid little attention to the status of federal-state relations in
the regulation of labor disputes. Today there hardly appears a
volume of a legal journal that does not contain the product of new
efforts to bring order out of the chaos that prevails in this area.1
A number of writers have apparently given up the task of reconciling statutory provisions with case law and case law with sound
federal policy, and have resorted to the simpler, yet challenging,
method of proposing amendments to existing federal statutes.2
Worthy as these efforts may be in calling attention to the need for
further congressional action and in suggesting possible courses for
such action, they are of little help to unions and employers who
are now suffering the consequences of congressional stagnation.
New cases are appearing with what seems to be increasing frequency, and recent decisions suggest the probability that a further
increase of litigation in this area is in the offing.
No effort will be made here to offer a complete restatement of
the present law of federalism in labor relations. In the first place,
there is considerable disagreement as to what that law is. In the
second place, the legal periodicals and some of the recent decisions
have devoted hundreds and perhaps thousands of pages to that
task. Consequently, the aim of this comment will be only to select
certain portions of the problem and examine those portions in the
light of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,3 decided last March by
the United States Supreme Court.

I.

The Areas of Jurisdictional Conflict

At the outset, it would be well to distinguish briefly the two
quite distinct areas of conflict between federal and state jurisdiction in the labor field. First, there are those conflicts which have
their roots in the fact that Congress has vested in the National
Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over certain disputes "affecting commerce." Students of constitutional law are aware that the
term "affecting commerce" now covers a multitude of sins-and
1 Seven lead articles on the subject are cited in 53 MICH. L. REv. 602 at 604, n. 9
(1955). To these may be added Roumell and Schlesinger, "The Preemption Dilemma in
Labor Relations," 18 UNIV. DET. L.J. 17, 135 (1954-1955); Brody, "Federal Pre-emption
Comes of Age in Labor Relations,'' 5 LAB. L.J. 743 (1954).
2 See Roumell and Schlesinger, "The Preemption Dilemma in Labor Relations," 18
UNIV. DET. L.J. 135 (1955); Brody, "Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age in Labor Relations," 5 LAB. L.J. 743 (1954).
a 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480 (1955).
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sinners. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Board's power
was soon recognized as being considerably broader in scope than
that which available appropriations and personnel would permit
the Board to exercise. Partly because of this and perhaps partly
because it has been thought that matters essentially local in character should be handled by local authorities, the Board has declined to take jurisdiction over certain classes of cases which fall
within the powers granted to it by Congress.4 Here the question
has been, who, if anyone, has jurisdiction over cases which the
Board in its discretion has declined, or would decline, to take on
jurisdictional grounds. The answer would be easy were it not for
the proviso to section 10 (a) of the amended National Labor Relations Act.5 This proviso states, in substance, that the Board has
power to cede its jurisdiction to state agencies under certain conditions, one of which is that the applicable state law may not be inconsistent with "the corresponding provision" of the Taft-Hartley
Act. Since no state labor law is patterned exactly along the lines
of Taft-Hartley, no state has "corresponding provisions" which
enable its agencies to receive grants of jurisdiction from the
Board.6 Thus, the proviso to section 10 (a) serves no purpose
other than to offer support for the idea that a vacuum is created
when the Board declines to take jurisdiction-a vacuum wherein
neither federal nor state law is applicable. That such a vacuum
does indeed exist continues to be the view of some courts7 and
4 The most recent announcement of standards which the Board will employ in deciding whether to assume jurisdiction over a given case appears in NLRB Releases R-445
and R-449, July 1 and 15, 1954. On the scope of Board jurisdiction, see, generally, I
CCH LAB. L. REP. ifl610 (1955). Approval of the Board's practice of limiting its own
jurisdiction was indicated in NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675, 71 S.Ct. 943 (1951).
5 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 146, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160. The
post Taft-Hartley history of this section is discussed in Brody, "Federal Pre-emption Comes
of Age in Labor Relations," 5 LAB. L.J. 743 at 764 (1954), where the author points out
that Congress has been reluctant to amend the section even though the problems it has
created have been recognized.
6 To date no cession agreements have been made by the Board pursuant to the
proviso to §10 (a). But see Satin, Inc. v. Local Union 445, !BEW, (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954)
26 CCH Lab. Cas. if68,508, for an instance in which a state court construed a Board refusal
to assert its jurisdiction as a cession under this proviso. The soundness of such a construction is, to say the least, questionable.
7See Retail Clerks Local 1564 v. Your Food Stores of Santa Fe, (10th Cir. 1955) 225
F. (2d) 659; Adelphia Construction Co. v. Building &: Construction Trades Council of
Philadelphia, (Pa. Com. Pl. 1954) 27 CCH Lab. Cas. 'fi68,843; Universal Car and Service
Co. of Grand Rapids v. 1AM, Lodge 1573, (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954) 27 CCH Lab. Cas. ,I68,825;
WERB v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 200, 267 Wis. 356, 66 N.W. (2d) 318
(1954). But see Satin, Inc. v. Local Union 445, !BEW, (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954) 26 CCH
Lab. Cas. 'fi68,508; Cleveland v. Local Union 655, Plumbers, (Pa. Com. Pl. 1954) 27 CCH
Lab. Cas. 'fi68,842. Cf. NYSLRB v. Wags Transportation System, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) 26
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writers. 8 Its very absurdity, however, may well result in Supreme
Court disregard for this strict interpretation of section 10 (a), in
so far as Board refusals to accept jurisdiction are concerned.9
The other area of jurisdictional conflict is broader in scope
than the one just described; it is not occasioned by the Board's exercise of discretionary power to decline jurisdiction. Instead, it
stems from the fact that the Board has not been given exclusive
jurisdiction over all types of labor disputes in industries affecting
commerce. Federal legislation has created certain rights and has
prohibited some specified types of conduct, but some powers have,
nevertheless, been reserved to the states. Thus, the· Board's jurisdiction is limited in subject matter to that which has been conferred upon it. At the same time, in so far as Congress has not
acted to govern completely a particular sphere of activity, some
authority remains in state agencies. Just where that state authority begins and ends, however, is more than a little in doubt. First,
it is apparent that the exact limits of Board jurisdiction to grant
relief have not yet been fixed. In fact, it is unlikely that they will
· ever be fixed with precision under current statutes because of the
broad language employed in section 7 and 8 of the amended
CCH Lab. Cas. ,I68,754. In the Universal Car case, supra, the court concluded that to
recognize the vacuum would be a lesser evil than the chaos that woµld result from having
state court jurisdiction depend upon the day to day discretionary jurisdiction of the
Board, that discretion being dependent upon budgetary conditions and the economic,
political and social views of the Board members. Apparently the court entertains the'
quaint notion that an absence of law is better than a changing law.
State labor boards have also had occasion to adopt one view or the other. The
Michigan, New York and Wisconsin boards have rejected the "no-man's land" view. See
6 L\B. L.J. 602 (1955).
8 E.g.: Hays, "Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States," 102 UNIV. PA.
L ..REv. 959 at 976 (1954); Brody, "Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age in Labor Relations,''
5 LAB. L.J. 743 at 763 (1954). Both authors, however, deplore the result.
9 See Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U.S. 933, 74 S.Ct. 373
(1954), where the Supreme Court declined to pass on the question of state court jurisdiction because the Board had not yet refused to entertain the case and there had been
no showing that it would have been futile to apply to the Board for relief.
In the course of announcing a rather novel "solution" to the vacuum dilemma in two
recent cases, the California Supreme Court neatly sidestepped the language of §IO (a). _In
Benton, Inc. v. Painters Local 333, (Calif. 1955) 37 L.R.R.M. 2251, it was held that where
an employer's business affects interstate commerce but does not meet the Board's minimum jurisdictional standards, a state court is without jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful
organizational picketing in the absence of an express refusal by the Board to take jurisdiction. On the other hand, in Garmon v. Building Trades Council, (Calif. 1955) 37
L.R.R.M. 2233, it was held that where the Regional Director has affirmatively refused to
take jurisdiction on behalf of the Board, a state court has jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful
organizational picketing, even if the employer's business affects interstate commerce. The
most remarkable feature of the latter decision was the court's conclusion that in such circumstances the state court will apply federal law rather than state law. At least one feature
of the case is not remarkable: three judges dissented.
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NLRA and because of the changing interpretations of that language by the Board itself. Second, there appears to be some basis
for concluding that, as to very limited areas at least, both the
Board and a state agency may, on different grounds, exercise jurisdiction over the same conduct.
At the very least, a birdseye view of decisional law leading up
to Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. is necessary to a proper appreciation of the contribution made by that case. Weber, however,
involved only the second of the two classes of jurisdictional problems described above, i.e., those cases in which the Board has not
declined to entertain the matter on jurisdictional grounds. The
remainder of this comment, therefore, will be devoted principally
to an examination of problems in that class of cases.
A. Prohibited Areas of State Action. The states are precluded from interfering with or restraining the free exercise of
rights granted by federal labor legislation. This principle itself is
a rather simple outgrowth of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, but the labor cases in which the Supreme Court has
found occasion to invoke it have involved subtle questions of
whether the particular state regulations actually constituted infringements upon federally granted rights.10 State agencies and
courts are also precluded from entertaining questions involving
certification of appropriate bargaining units and representatives
in industries affecting commerce.11 Finally, the states may not
enjoin under their own labor legislation conduct which is forbidden by federal labor law.12
B. Permissible Areas of State Action. Injunctions and other
remedies under state law are available where violence occurs or is
threatened or where mass picketing takes place.13 The same is
true where a union engages in recurrent and unannounced work
stoppages,1 4 and where other matters are involved which are
neither regulated nor consciously left unregulated by Congress.15
Finally, the state court damage remedy is sometimes available since
10 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945); Amalgamated Street Ry. Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359 (1951); International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454, 70 S.Ct. 781 (1950).
11 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NYSLRB, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (1947); La Crosse
Telephone Corp. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 18, 69 S.Ct. 379 (1949).
12 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953).
13 Allen-Bradley Local No. llll v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942).
14International Union, UAW-AFL v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949), the
so-called Briggs-Stratton case.
15Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584 (1949).
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the federal law does not provide for compensatory relief in all
cases and thus there is no conflict between state and federal
remedies.16 This is the case at least where the conduct complained
of is_ not protected under Taft-Hartley.
II.

The Contribution of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

Two unions in the St. Louis area, the International Association
of Machinists and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners (hereinafter referred to as the IAM and the Carpenters),
each claimed the same type of work for their respective members.
Each union represented a portion of the employees of the Anheuser-Busch company. From 1948 to 1952, with the exception of
one year, there appeared in the contract between the IAM and
the company a provision to the effect that when the repair or replacement of machinery was necessary, this work would be given
only to those contractors who had collective agreements with IAM.
Prior to negotiations on the 1952 contract between IAM and the
company, the Carpenters threatened to make no new contract with
the company unless this provision was deleted from the IAM contract. The company therefore refused to agree to a renewal of
that provision in the 1952 IAM contract, whereupon the IAM
went on strike. The company immediately filed charges against
the IAM with the NLRB, alleging that the union was engaging in
an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the
amended NLRA. Eleven days later the company filed charges
against the IAM in a state court, alleging that the strike constituted
not only a secondary boycott under Missouri law, but also a violation of subsection (A), (B) and (D) of section 8 (b) (4) of the
amended NLRA and section 303 (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the LaborManagement Relations Act. After obtaining a temporary injunction in the state court, the c~mpany amended its complaint to include a charge that the conduct of the IAM constituted an illegal
conspiracy in restraint of trade under Missouri common .law and
conspiracy statutes. The state court injunction was made permanent on September 30, 1952, some seven weeks before the Board
quashed the notice of a hearing on the alleged violation of section
8 (b) (4) (D). When the Board finally acted on November 18,
1952, it held that there was no unfair labor practice under section
8 (b) (4) (D) in the conduct of the IAM strike.17 On February 8,
16 United

Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Co., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct.

.

m~~
17 District

No. 9, 1AM, IOI N.L.R.B. 346 (1952).
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1954, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the 1AM strike was
enjoinable under the state's restraint of trade statute. The state
supreme court treated the Board's action as a determination that
no unfair labor practice was involved.18 On certiorari, this decision was unanimously reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.
The Court first rejected the state court's conclusion that the
Board's action amounted to a finding that no unfair labor practice
was involved. A determination that there was no violation of
section 8 (b) (4) (D), said the Court, does not necessarily mean that
there was no violation of other provisions of the federal law.19
Moreover, such a determination does not settle the question of
whether the conduct involved was protected under section 7 of the
amended NLRA. In each case, said the Court, it is for the Board
to determine whether the conduct complained of may be violative
of other provisions of the federal law or may be a protected activity
under section 7. Having found that there was some reasonable
possibility that the IAM strike was either an unfair labor practice
or a protected activity, the Court concluded that the state court
had no jurisdiction in the matter because the Board has exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin conduct which has been regulated by the
federal government.
It was urged before the Court that this case was distinguishable
from Garner v. Teamsters Union20 on the ground that here the
union activity was enjoined under a "general" statute having no
particular relevance to labor relations, whereas in the Garner case
the state was attempting to regulate, in a labor statute, the same
conduct that was covered by the federal act. The Court's answer
to this contention is both interesting and mildly surprising.
"We do not think this distinction is decisive. In Garner
the emphasis was not on two conflicting labor statutes but
rather on two similar remedies, one state and one federal,
brought to bear on precisely the same conduct. And in Capital
18 Anheuser-Busch,
19 The limitations

Inc. v. Weber, 364 Mo. 573, 265 S.W. (2d) 325 (1954).
imposed upon Board jurisdiction by the Taft-Hartley Act dictate
this conclusion. The Board is empowered to issue unfair labor practice complaints, conduct hearings and render decisions only when charges have been filed by a party interested in the dispute. This being the case, a party could circumvent the pre-emption
doctrine simply by filing an unfair labor practice charge on the weakest possible ground
and getting an adverse determination from the Board. This evasive tactic is foreclosed
by the holding in the Weber case.
20 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953).
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Service, Inc. v. Labor Board . . .. we did not stop to inquire
just what category of 'public policy' the union's conduct allegedly violated." 21
Whether the Court intended this language to mean that a state's
interest in the matter is entirely immaterial when an unfair labor
practice is involved is not quite clear. If such was the meaning of
the italicized passage above, the result would be that even violent
conduct, such as was involved in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v.
W ERB,22 and unannounced work stoppages, such as were involved
in International Union, UAW-AFL v. WERB,23 would not be subject to a state injunction if an unfair labor practice coincidentally
accompanied the violence or the work stoppages.24 (It will be recalled that in neither of these cases was there any serious suggestion
that the enjoined activity constituted an unfair labor practice, and
in each case it was determined by the Court that the activity was
not protected under federal law. In fact, there was no such thing
as an unfair labor practice by a union at the time of the AllenBradley case.) If, on the other hand, the Court merely intended
to exclude as a basis for the exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction
those state policies which are shields for the regulation of labor
relations or which threaten to impede substantially the orderly
regulation of matters within Board jurisdiction, then the AllenBradley and Briggs-Stratton cases still authorize effective state
restraints on labor activities. This would seem to be the better
interpretation of the Court's language. The opinion in the Weber
case contains several approving references to Allen-Bradley, and
nowhere else in the opinion is it suggested that the doctrine of that
case was being impaired.
21 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 at 479-480, 75 S.Ct. 480 (1955). Emphasis added.
22 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942).
23 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949), the so-called Briggs-Stratton case.
24 Following the Garner case, it was thought in some circles that the states were
precluded from entertaining jurisdiction to restrain violence growing out of labor disputes in industries affecting commerce. State courts have uniforII!-lY held, however, that
the power of the states in this regard was unimpaired by the Garner case. Perez v.
Trifiletti, (Fla. 1954) 74 S. (2d) 100; WERB v. United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Implement Workers, (Wis. 1955) 70 N.W. (2d) 191. In McQuay, Inc. v. International Union,
UAW-CIO, (Minn. 1955) 72 N.W. (2d) 81, a case in which the Weber case was cited, it
was expressly held that a state court may enjoin violent conduct even when that conduct
also constitutes an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act. No case has been
found in which a contrary result was reached, and it seems safe to say that there will be
none under current legislation. If violence falls within state jurisdiction even when
accompanying an otherwise protected activity, it is difficult to see why an accompanying
unfair labor practice should deprive _the state of jurisdiction. In either event the relationship of the state agency to the NLRB is the same.
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Regardless of which of the above two interpretations is the
correct one, it is nevertheless true that several other Supreme
Court decisions have diminished considerably in significance with
the announcement of the Weber decision. In Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co.,25 the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a state injunction against picketing which sought to
compel the violation of a state restraint of trade statute. The only
constitutional issue praised or considered was the validity of the
decree under the Fourteenth Amendment.26 And in Building
Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam,21 the Court
upheld an injunction which restrained picketing designed to compel a hotel operator to employ union workers. Again the attention of the Court was directed to the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than to the developing concept of federal pre-emption.
The significance of these cases must now be confined to the actual
basis upon which they were decided, i.e., that the states may impose reasonable restraints upon peaceful picketing without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.28 No longer can it be said that
such restraints upon picketing or other concerted activities are
valid exercises of state police powers where there is some reasonable possibility that the activity is prohibited or protected by TaftHartley. The Court leaves no doubt on this point.
" ... where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within
the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably
deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act,
the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the
tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such
issues in the first instance. " 29
336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949).
The opinion in the Giboney case gives not the slightest hint of whether the employer's operations "affected interstate commerce" so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction
of the NLRB.
'
27 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950).
28 Two other cases often cited together with the Giboney and Gazzam cases as upholding state powers in the realm of labor relations are International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950), and Hughes v. Superior Court, 339
U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950). Actually, however, these cases, like Giboney and GazzaJD,
provide no authority for state court jurisdiction over matters regulated by federal labor
law.
29 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 478 at 481, 75 S.Ct. 480 (1955). In Local
No. 25, IBT v. N.Y., N.H., 8: H.R. Co., 350 U.S. 155, 76 S.Ct. 227 (1956), the Court invoked the quoted language in holding that a state court was without jurisdiction because
the plaintiff below had alleged an unfair labor practice in its amended complaint and
the Board had not declined to take jurisdiction. The opinion of the Court contains no
25
26
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Of added significance in this context is the Court's repetition of
language in the Garner case to the effect that peaceful picketing in
industries affecting commerce may not be restrained by the states
because Congress prescribed a detailed procedure for the restraint
of specified types of picketing and apparently intended that other
types would be free from further restraint. 30

III.

Some Practical Effects of the Weber Decision

There will doubtless be circumstances in which a state court
will feel free to exercise its injunctive powers even though labor
relations in industries affecting interstate commerce are involved.
Indeed, the Supreme Court apparently expects the state courts and
boards to do so where the facts of a particular case do not appear
to fall within the test formulated in the Weber case. Realizing
that the boundaries of the area pre-empted by the Taft-Hartley
Act are by no means precise, the Court has determined to fix those
boundaries through an arduous case-by-case method.31 Only
prompt action by Congress can save the Court and the parties from
this expensive and troublesome procedure for fixing the law of the
land. ,
There will, however, be many circumstances in which the state
court will want to be satisfied that the dispute involves neither a
protected nor a prohibited activity under Taft-Hartley before it
will assume jurisdiction. In such a case, the party considering
himself to be aggrieved and entitled to injunctive relief has no
alternative but to file a charge with the Board.32 In so doing, it
reference to the employer's argument that the evidence failed to show the occurrence of
an unfair labor practice. See 24 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 3134 (1955).
30 Indicative of the fact that all state courts are not prepared to accept the Garner
language concerning picketing as being sound law is the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Milwaukee Boston Store Co. v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers,
(Wis. 1955) 6~ N.W. (2d) 762. Even Justice Frankfurter's repetition of that language in
the Weber case failed to impress the Wisconsin court. See also the California cases referred
to in note 9 supra.
31 It is interesting to note that the Court, with Justice Frankfurter leading the way,
has departed from its former policy of fixing arbitrary limits to state jurisdiction in this
field. Compare the opinion of the Court, and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion,
in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NYSLRB, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026 {1947). See also Cox,
"Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations," 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297 (1954), where the
author argues thaf arbitrary boundaries of state jurisdiction are preferable to the flexible
and uncertain standards now employed _by the Court. Professor Cox points out that the
policy now in effect is excessively burdensome and expensive to litigants, and that the
occasional hardships which would attend the fixing of more certain standards do not
warrant this burden and expense.
. 32 Of course, if a damage action is available to him, he may avail himself of the rule
of United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833 (1954).
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will behoove him to allege every conceivable violation of the federal act, for if he fails to allege some possible ground for obtaining
relief from the Board, his access to the state court or board will
remain closed. At this point, he is at the mercy of the regional
director or the general counsel of the Board. These officials may
in an appropriate case refuse to issue a complaint on jurisdictional
grounds, thus raising the first class of federalism problems discussed above. Secondly, they may refuse to issue a complaint on
the ground that no unfair labor practice has been committed by
the party against whom the charge is brought.33 In this event, it
may at first appear that the way is clear for the complainant to
bring his action before a state court or board. But the situation
is not this simple. The activity complained of may be either protected or prohibited under federal law, but it is not the function
of the regional director or general counsel to determine whether
a given activity is protected or prohibited. Their function in the
realm of unfair labor practices is limited to the issuance of complaints and the prosecution of those complaints before the Board
or its hearing officers. Thus, it is by no means clear that a refusal
on the part of these officials to issue a complaint will satisfy a
state court that it is entitled to entertain the cause.34
Supposing, however, that a complaint is issued on each charge
alleged by the moving party (an unlikely event since that party
will have alleged violations of the Taft-Hartley Act on every conceivable ground, some of which are likely to be tenuous), the case
will then be carried to the Board. If the requested relief is granted,
the complainant will probably be satisfied despite the usual delay
in processing such complaints. If he is denied relief, the scope
of the Board's determination will become important. If the Board
determines only that no unfair labor practice was committed, it
is conceivable that the state court would still decline to assume
jurisdiction because the conduct "may be reasonably deemed" to
come within the protection afforded by the Taft-Hartley Act. If,
on the other hand, the Board decides that the conduct complained
of was not only not an unfair labor practice, but was also a protected
activity, then the charging party is definitely foreclosed from any
33 The
34 The

determination of the general counsel is conclusive in this respect.
general counsel's refusal to issue a complaint may result from the fact that
his investigation discloses no activity which, in his estimation, constitutes an unfair labor
practice. The question left open by such a refusal is whether Congress has either pro•
tected the activity or determined that it shall be left unregulated. In either event the state
court or board is seemingly precluded from exercising jurisdiction. See Gulf Shipside
Storage Corp. v. Moore, (La. 1955) 23 U.S. LAW WEEK 2494 (1955). See also note 36 infra.
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state m1unctive remedy. 35 Only if the Board decides that the
activity in issue is neither protected nor prohibited is the way
open for the assumption of state jurisdiction to issue injunctions.36
I.t follows from what has been said that the Weber case imposes
upon the Board a moral obligation to state with clarity and completeness its basis for denying relief in an unfair labor practice
case. Failing such clarity and completeness, a party may be denied
a remedy from a state court or board although he is entitled to it.

IV.

Conclusion

The Weber case has not fixed with precision the line of demarcation between exclusive federal jurisdiction and state jurisdiction. It has, however, cleared away at least one barrier to clear
thinking in confining the Giboney and Gazzam cases to the limited
issues they involved.
Together with this clarification, the Court has highlighted
what promises to be a new classification of state police powers. A
subtle contrast has been made between the states' "historic powers
over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order"37
and their powers to regulate labor matters through the medium of
laws designed primarily for controlling harmful business and trade
practices. As stated above, the states are apparently still free to
restrain violence and other breaches of the peace irrespective of
accompanying unfair labor practices or the exercise of otherwise
protected activities. In this respect, the states exercise powers
over "local matters." On the other hand, the control of trade
restraints and monopolies and· the imposition of obligations upon
common carriers are apparently deemed to be something other
than "local matters" since a state may not now exercise these
powers when the conduct sought to be controlled is also governed
by federal labor law.38
What basis the Court finds for such a classification is not made
clear by the opinion in the Weber case. While the Court invokes
the "conflict of remedies" reasoning of the Garner case, it is submitted that this reasoning is not an adequate justification for the
35 Appeal

may be taken to the appropriate circuit court of appeals.
state agency must still contend, however, with the theory suggested in Garner
and repeated in Weber that when Congress has regulated certain types of conduct in
considerable detail, it· has impliedly decreed that other related conduct shall remain
unregulated by state law.
37 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 at 749, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942).
38 In addition to the Weber case, see General Drivers, Warehousemen, 8: Helpers,
Local Union No. 89 v. American Tobacco Co., 348 U.S. 978, 75 S.Ct. 569 (1955).
36 The

1956]

COMMENTS

551

nullification of state business regulations merely because an unfair
labor practice may be involved. It is at least arguable that the
problem of regulating business activity is as much a matter of
"local concern" as is the problem of restraining violent conduct
occurring in the context of labor disputes. And if the concept of
"conflict" may be interpreted to include, in part, an equivalence
in the activities the two regulatory systems are designed to govern,
there is, to this degree, no conflict between state restraints on unlawful business and trade practices and federal restraints on unfair labor practices. There is, it is submitted, much to be said
for approaching the problem as one of characterizing the vantage
point underlying the attempted state regulation.
It may be that the Court has extended the scope of pre-emption
announced in Garner because of a fear or suspicion that state
business regulations were being used to circumvent federal
authority over labor matters. There are indications that such a
trend has been gaining momentum. Nevertheless, if this is the
rationale of the Court, one may question with reason the breadth
of the new pre-emption doctrine. Surely the task of distinguishing
between legitimate state business laws and those that are merely
colorable devices for regulating labor matters is not insurmountable.
Robert B. Olsen, S.Ed.

